O dever de fundamentação das decisões judiciais e o Artigo 489 §1º, do CPC: rupturas, continuidades ou resistências?

Abstract

This work intends to describe and problematize, from an empirical perspective, whether and how §1 of article 489 of the Code of Civil Procedure is, or is not, being implemented in our justice system. The research hypothesis came from a doubt (or strangeness), in the sense that, although the 2015 CPC has outlined objective parameters to delimit the concept of "reasoned decision", the effective implementation of this new device, in the Brazilian procedural context, tends to suffer resistance, especially from the judiciary, insofar as it imposes strict duties and regulations, with the potential to restrict the autonomy of the power of court order. In an incipient way, and without intending to generalize the results of the research, we verified, through formal and informal interviews with fifteen (15) judges of the Justice Court of the state of Rio de Janeiro (TJERJ), that, in fact, the new wording of article 489, paragraph 1, of the CPC, has been presenting as a rupture proposal that confronts the sedimented structure of the Brazilian procedural system, revealing itself, the referred device, as an obstacle or, at least, a challenge, in the practical field of Law. However, more than in the name of the freedom to decide, surprisingly, the interviewees’ speeches revealed that the goal of procedural speed is one of the main obstacles to the duty of reasoning, because it would be “impossible to be speedy and comply with article 489 at the same time."